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Westudy the competition betweentwopolitical parties for seats in a parliament. The
parliamentwill settwotypes of policies: ideologicalandnon-ideological.Thepartieshave fixed
positions onthe ideological issues, but choose theirnon-ideological platformsto attract voters
andcampaign contributions. In this context, we ask: Flow do the equilibrium contributions from
special interest groups influence the platforms of the parties? We show that each party is
induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of
infonried voters and members of special interest groups. The party that is expected to win a
majority of seats caters more to the special interests.
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Special interest groups appear to wield considerable influence over public policy in
many representative democracies. The trade policies of many industrialized countries
favorvestedinterests in the apparel, textile, and smokestack industries. Their agri-
cultural policies givevariousforms of income support to farmers. Health and safety
measures showthe imprimatur ofthe local insurance industry on the one hand, and
of powerful labor unions on the other- And manufacturers have had much to say
about a myriad of environmental and regulatory policies. It seems difficult to argue
that the poLitical process serves only the interests of the median voter.
interest groups pursue their quest for political advantage by a number of different
means. They gather information that supports their positions and make it available
to powerful politicians- They take their arguments to the public in an effort to win
voter sympathy. Sometimes they undertake disruptive activities, which are intended
to coerce rather than persuade. And, of course, they contribute to political parties
and to individual candidates' campaigns.
This paper focuses on interest groups' use of campaign contributions as a vehicle
for influencing public policy. Contributions may take the form of cash transfers
or gifts in kind. In any event, we assume that the contributions can be used by
the candidates to persuade and cajole a group of undecided voters. Our aim is to
characterize the policies that emerge when rival groups vie for the politicians' favor
while the politicians themselves compete (or voter support.
The literature on campaign giving identifies two motives that interest groups might
have when they contribute to politicians or to political parties. Contributors with an
electoralmotive intendto promote the electoral prospects of preferred candidates.
Those with an influence motiveaimto influence the politicians' policy pronounce-
ments. Our model allows interest groups to entertain either or both of these reasons
for giving, but our analysis of the equilibrium emphasizes the second. We believe
that special interests do often try to use their campaign gifts to influence politicians'
positions and we find support for this view in the empirical evidence presentedby
Kau and Rubin (1982), Fremdreis and Waterman (1985), Tosini and Tower (1987),
Sand others.
Oursetting is oneinwhichtwo politicalparties contest a parliamentary election.
The parliament will be called upon to set two types of policies, which we will refer
to as ideological and non-ideological. \Ve term an issue ideological if the parties have
predetermined preferences concerning the matter. Examples might include civil rights
policy, abortion policy, and aspects of foreign policy in certain countries. We take
the parties' policy preferences on the ideological issues—and indeed their platform
positions—as a given in our model. Our locus is instead on the determination of
non-ideological policies, those over which the politicians have no explicit preferences.
Many, although not all, economic policies fall into this category, as do some types of
social policy such as (perhaps) environmental protection and gun control,
Our interest groups are collections of individuals who share a common interest
in the non-ideological policies. These organized groups can offer contributions to
one or both of the political parties. Their gifts may be granted unconditionally or
they may be tied to the positions adopted by the recipients. Unconditional gifts are
used to satisfy an electoraL motive for giving, while contingent gifts are designed to
influence decisions. We assume that the groups are able to communicate the sense of
their conditional offers, even if they cannot spell out the details inlegally binding
contract.
If the interest groups choose to offer contingent contributions, they will confront
the parties with a fundamental trade-off. By setting a platform that serves the gen-
eral interest, a party can attract votes from the portion of the electorate that is
well-informed about the issues. But by choosing policies that cater to the special in-
terests it may be able to elicit greater contributions that then can be used to influence
the voting of less-informed or less-rational voters. We assume that the parties resolve
this trade-off with the aim of maximizing their representation in the parliament. An
equilibrium consists of a pair of platforms and a set of contribution schedules, such
that no group or party can better its lot given the anticipated actions of the others-
The equilibrium platforms and associated contributions together determine the elec-
tion outcome, which in turn determines the likelihood that each party's platform will
2be enacted.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss
the relationship of our paper to several others in the literature. Section 3 describes
the details of the model. In Section 4, we examine a special case in which there is
only a single. organized interest group while Section .5 treats the general case with
competition among groups. The last section contains a summary of our findings.
2 Related Literature
There is, of course, a vast literature on policy determination in representative democ-
racies. Our goat in this section is to explain the relationship of our paper to some
others that have a similar focus. We make no claims to comprehensive coverage.
Our paper has antecedents in the literature on probabilistic voting.' Enelow and
Hinich (1982), for example, developed a 'spatial' model in which voters' utilities
comprise two additively separable components. One component relates to the policy
issue under consideration while the other reflects exogenous characteristics of the
candidates- The politicians were assumed unable to observe individual tastes with
regard to the exogenous characteristics. In consequence, they remain uncertain about
how any individual will vote, even if they know how he or she will be affected by the
policy in question.2
Lindbeck and Weibuil (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1994) adopted a similar
probabilistic.voting approach to study policies that redistribute income to narrow
groups of voters. They assumed that the various groupsdiffer in their predisposition
to the parties and identified characteristics of a group that make it a goodcandidate
to receive political largesse. Although these authors focused on the determinantsof
the political success of special interests, there is an important difference betweentheir
'Weconsiderthis labelto be something of a misnomer. In our model, and in manyothers in
the literature, every individualvotes deterministically. It is only that the politicians do not know
individuals preferencesonsome issues,which causesthem to beuncertain about howa particular
ballot will be cast.
2See also Couglin (1984, 1986) and Whitman (t983), and Mueller (1989, ch. 11) for a survey
3models andours. Specifically, they did not allow interest groups to compete actively
for favors whereas we are primarily interested in how campaign contributions can he
used as a tool for such competition.
We treat campaign contributions here in much the same way as in Grossman and
Helpman (1994). There we built on Bernheim and Whinston (1986). who described
influence-seeking as an example of a "menu auction" game. In a menu auction, each
of several principals who will be affected by an action offers a bid to an agent who
will take that action. These bids take the form of schedules that associate payment
to the agent with each feasible option. Once the agent chooses an action, all of the
principaLs pay the bids stipulated by their schedules. Bernheim and Whinston dehned
an equilibrium in a menu auction as a set of contribution schedules such that each
one is a best response to all of the others, and an action by the agent that maximizes
her utility given the schedules that confront her.
Our 1994 paper provided an application of this view of influence-seeking. We
focused on the determination of import and export taxes and subsidies in a small, open
economy. We took the government to be a common agent for a group of special interest
groups, each representing the owners of some industry-specific factor. The policy
makers, who were already in power, were assumed to set trade policy to maximize a
weighted sum of total campaign contributions and aggregate (or average) welfare. In
this model, the incumbent government did not face any explicit competition from rival
candidates nor did we provide any rigorous justification for its assumed objective.
Austen-Smith (1987) and Baron (1992) addressed very similar issues to the ones
that interest us here. Both of these authors studied policy determination in a two-
party model of electoral competition. And both were interested in the effects of
campaign contributions by special interest groups. Austen-Smith assumed that the
parties use campaign funds to alleviate (risk averse) voters' uncertainty about their
policy positions. Baron, like us, allowed campaign spending to have a direct effect on
the voting behavior of a group of uninformed voters. A more important distinction
between their papers and ours concerns the motive that groups are assumed to have
for giving to the parties. In both Austen-Smith and Baron the lobbies take platforms
4as given and offer gifts to their favorites with an eye toward affecting the probabilities
of election.3 Here, we do riot restrict interest groups to such an electoral motive, but
also afford them an opportunity to influence the parties' platforms.
3 The Model
We examine a jurisdiction with two political parties, an exogenous number of special
interest groups, and a fixed continuum of voters. Our description begins with the
voters.
3.1 The voters
Like Baron (1992), we distinguish the behavior of two classes of voters, the informed
and the uninformed. Informed voters are those who know and understand the parties'
positions on both the ideological and non'ideological issues and who vote based on
their personal evaluations of the merits of the alternative platforms. In the model
developed here, this is a dominant strategy for these voters. The uninformed voters,
by contrast, are unable to evaluate the parties's positions on (at least) the non-
ideological issues. These voters may have initial leanings toward one party or the
other, but at least some of them can be swayed by the messages they receive in the
course of the campaign. Let a denote the fraction of these uninformed (perhaps
'impressionable' is a better word) in the total voting population.
3Magee etat.(1989) make asimilar assumptionin the context oftheirmodels of tradepolicy
formation.
'Thisis Baron'sassumption in thelast part of his paper, where he allows for several competing
interest groups and considers the determination of "collective" policies.Inthe first part of his paper.
dealing with "particularist" policies, the contributions are simply an exogenous fraction of the net
benefits captured by the interest group. Although Baron refers to this as a bargaining solution, he
does not specify any explicit bargaining process and his 'solution" fails to account for the surplus
to the political party relative to the fatlback option.
An advantage that we see of our model compared to Baron's—beyond the one we stress inthe
text—is that it is capable of handling both particularist policies (with a single interest group)and
collective policies (with multiple interest groups) within the same analytical framework.
3Consider then a typical informed voter with the Label 1. This individual derives
utility tf(p") from the vector p'4 of non-ideological policies endorsed by party A, and
utility u(p5) from the vector p8 of such policies endorsed by party B. with u'(-)
continuous and differentiable. She votesfor the candidates from party .4 ii and only
if u'(p4) —ulp2)￿ 3', where 3' measures herassessment of thesuperiority(or
inferiority,ifnegative)of party 8sideological position relative to thatof party -k.
We assume that the parties cannot observe the ideological leanings of any particular
individual,although they presume these to be drawn from a known distribution of
such proclivities in the total population of informed voters. Moreover, we assume that
the distribution of ideological preferences is statistically independent of the effects of
the non-ideological policies on individuals' utilities, and that it can be described by the
cumulative distribution function, F(j3). Then both parties will perceive a probability
—u'(p8)]that individual I will vote for the slate of candidates from party
A. Vith a continuum of informed voters, the law of large numbers implies that the
share of informed ballots cast for party A equals fE(F(u'(p") —u'(p8)Jdi, where
I denotes the set of informed voters and uithetotal number (or measure) of such
in di vi duals.
Artuninformedvoter, too, may have a predisposition toward one party or the
other. However, this leaning can be overcome with enough campaign rhetoric. In
particular, if party A spends more on its campaign than party B, some of those who
were initially inclined toward party B will vote instead [or party A. We denote by
H(•) the fraction of the uninformed voters that votes for party A, and assume that
it depends on the difference in the parties' total campaign budgets.5
isperhaps more common in the literature to assume that the ratio of campaign expenditures
affects the allocation of votes. See, for example, Baron (1989, 1992), and Snyder (1989). In our
view, a specification in terms of absolute differences is more reasonable, because a luger budget
allows a campaign to reach a wider segment of the population. This view could be formalized in a
model of advertising similar to the one in Grossman and Shapiro (1984), where the fraction of the
target population that bean a given messAge is assumed to vary with the amount that i5 spent on
the advertising campaign. If each message that an uninformed voter bean makes him more likely
to vote for the party issuing the announcement, then the number of uninformed will depend on the
6We assume that seats in the parliament are allocated by proportional representa-
don. Then the fraction of the legislature controlled by party A matches the fraction
of the totalvotesgarnered by this party. Letting s denote this fraction, we have
=Ia
f F[u'(p4) —u'(p8)ldi+ 0H(CA —C8). (1)
ni'El
where CK is the total campaign spending undertaken by party K.
3.2The parties and the government
Eachparty seeks to maximize its representation in the parliament (or anyrnonotoni-
cally increasing function thereof). The parties may see this as their objective for one
of several reasons. First, a political party may reward its core nembers with jobs
in and around the government. The number of such jobs that a party can allocate
increases with the number of its seats in the parliament. Second, a party's prospects
for implementing its ideological program—about which it may care deeply—may in-
crease with the size of its parliamentary contingent. Third, the ideological program
that is ultimately implemented may reflect a compromise among party positions.
Then the final policy might be closer to a party's most-preferred outcome the larger
is its parliamentary representation. Of course, with two parties and propprtional
representation, the objective of maximizing seats is equivalent to thatof maximizing
(expected) plurality in the election. This is a commonly assumed objectivein the
literature on electoral competition.6
With this objective, parties A and B choose their platforms on the non-ideological
issues in order to maximize .s and 1 — s, respectively. They do so recognizingthat
their policy endorsements will affect their popularity among the infotilLed voters.At
the same time, the non-ideological policy platforms are chosen with an eyetoward
the organized interest groups, who may vary their support according tothe positions
difference in the sizes of the two budgets. -
6See, for example,Enelow and Uinich (1982), Denzau andKatz (1977) and Couglin and Nitzan
(1981).The different campaign objectives that candidates might holdare discussed and compared
inAranson, HinichandOrdeshook (1974).
7that are taken. The parties know that any contributions they collect can beusedto
hoanceelectLofleering activities.
After the election is over, the parliament convenes to set policy. We do not model
the iegislative process in any detail. Rather, we assume that each party attempts to
implement its announced platform and that a party's probability of success increases
monotonicailv with the size of Legislative delegation. In other words, the parliament
adopts the vector of non-ideological policies p' with probability p(s), and the vector
p2 with probability 1 — p(s), where = and y'(s) > 0. The function p(s)
may, for example, increase sharply just above s = [/2, if having a slight majority
of the seats in the parliament greatly enhances a party's prospects for successfully
implementing its program.t
While we believe it is reasonable to suppose that parties aim to maximize their
representation in the parliament and also that parties with legislative majorities some-
times fail to implement their programs, the appendix treats a more "pure" case. There
we examine policy determination when the parliament operates according to strict
majority rule and when parties seek to maximize their probability of winning a major-
ity. To conduct this alternative analysis, we must assume that the number of voters
is large but finite and that members of special interest groups constitute a negligible
share of the voting population. With these assumptions and a further one of equal
party popularity (i.e., the parties would each capture 50 percent of the vote if they
happened to choose ideittical non-ideological policies and to spend identical amounts
on their campaigns), the equilibrium policies are the same as the ones derived in the
main text.3
7We have alsoconsideredthe possibility that the political process produces a compromise among
the positions of the two parties. tf the compromise takes the form of a convex combination of their
platforms, then our main propositions still go through, provided that it remains a dominant strategy
for informed individuals to vote for their most-preferred candidate. However, the latter proviso
requires rather restrictive assumptions on the form and distribution of preferencis: in particular. we
need that every voter i who prefers p'4 to p2 has du'[Ap'4 + (I — A)p8/dA > 0. This would be
satisfied, for example, if voters fell into one of two groups, with those in one group preferring ever
higher values of the policy instrument and those in the other preferring ever lower values.
8Lindbeclc and WeibuU (1987) come to a similar conclusion in their study of electoral competition
S3.3 The special interests
Special interest groups are collections of voters who share a common interest in the
non-ideological policies. The members of a special interest group may differ in their
views on the ideological issues, and,inthe privacy of the polling booih. wilt behave
just like any other voter. Nonetheless, these individuals may have an incentive to
cooperate with one another, if by doing so they can influence the parties' positions
on the non-ideological issues.
As Olson (1965) has discussed, the mere fact that individuals share a common
interest in some policy or policies is not enough to ensure that they will engage in
collective political action. The temptation always exists for each to free ride on the
costly political efforts of the others. But some interest groups do overcome these
free-rider problems and manage to coordinate their lobbying activities. We take the
number and identities of the organized special interests as given (while recognizing
that it would be interesting to know how the policy environment serves to galvanize
certain interests and not others), and examine how these groups influence the policy-
setting process.
As we noted in the introduction, interest groups may have two motivations for
making campaign contributions. First, they may hope to influence the outcome of
the election. An interest group may gain if it can enhance the prospects of the
party whose position on the non-ideological issues is more similar toits own. Second,
interest groups may hope to influence the parties' policy platforms; that is, to push
the candidates to support policies that serve the group's own interests- Some ofthe
members of an interest group may object to spending on the first of these objectives,
if their ideological attitudes differ from those of the party that is being supported.
But all members of a group will agree on the desirability of pushing the two parties
toward the group's common desiratum on the non-ideological issues. Moreover,the
second motive remains even when the individual interest groups are relativelysmall,
without interest groups or campaign spending.Our analysisof the case in whichpattiesmaximize
their probability of winning is modelled after theirs.
9so that each one has little affect on the election outcome. While our specification of
the politicalgame allowsfor both motives, we will focus on cases where the lobbies
are small and where their interest in influencing policy positions overrides their desire
to further the prospects of one group of candidates or the other.
We denote by IV,(p)theaggregate utility that members of interest group) derive
from the vector of non-ideological policies p. If the preferences of the group's members
C,tI the non-ideological issues are literally identical, then this is simply the number of
members times the utility of the representative one. In any event, we assume that
the members of an interest group cooperate fully in their collective action, and so
seek to maximize their expected joint welfare from the non-ideological policies net of
campaign contributions. Letting C7 represent the contribution of interest group j to
party K, we write the objective function for this group as
= y(s)W(pA) +[I -y(s)]W1(p8) -C-Cf. (2)
Ifan interest group hopes to influence a party's policy choice, it must make sure
that the party sees a connection between its platform and the size of the contribution
that will be forthcoming. The group need not announce an explicit quidproquo:
indeed, the public might frown upon politicians who openly peddle their political
influence. Rather, the interest group needs only convey an understanding that its
contribution will vary with the position that is taken. We would argue that politicians
understand this connection quite well; proponents of gun control do not, (or example,
expect to receive any donations from the National Rifle Association.
We allow the interest groups considerable freedom in designing their contribution
schedules, Cf(p"). We assume only that the schedules are continuous, differentiable
when positive, and everywhere non-negative. The latter means that interest groups
can offer resources to the parties or withhold them, but cannot levy taxes on politi-
cians. A group can, of course, choose to make its contribution independent of policy;
in this way it can bolster the chances of its favorite party without causing it to lose
any (additional) informed votes. A group also might choose to offer its support to
only one of the two political parties.
103.4 Political equilibrium
Weseek a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of a two-stage. noncooperative, political
game. In the first stage, thevarious interest groups independently and simultaneously
communicate their contribution schedules, one to each of the two parties. In the
second stage. the parties choose their policy platforms. After the platforms are set.
the contributions are paid and the campaigns are waged. Then the election takes
place and finallythe legislaturemeets to implement one of the party's platforms.
We assume that all expectations about subsequent events are accurate and that all
promises are honored.9
More formally, we propose the following definition:
Definition1 An equilibrium consists of a pair of feasible policy vectors (pAo,pBo)
anda set of contribution schedules {CJ40(p),Cf0(pS)}, one for each lobby j,such
that
(a)v4° maximizes sgivenp°. {Ct0(pA ) } and {Cf(p2)}:
(b)pBO maximizes 1 —sgiven p4°, {C0(p)}and{Cf°(p8)};
(c) each Cf() is continuous and differentiable when positive,with C(pK)￿0 for
all pK; and
(d) for each lobby j,theredo not exist feasible contribution schedules Cf(p") and
such that
,,(i)W1(r) + [1 — W,(fi8)
—c;(r) — Cf(9) >
.(s)W(pA0) ÷ (1 —p(s)] Wj(pB0) — Ct0(p40) — C70(p80)
wherefr4 maximizes and9 minimizes
1 —&f
F[u1(p4) —u(p8)]di+ aH[E 0(pA)+CfV) — S Cr(p8) —
fl(.Et
91nour one-shot game,the interest groups have an incentiveto renege on their contrtbutionoffers
oncethe policy platforms are announced. Similafly. the politicians have no incentive to pursuetheir
non-ideological platforms in thelegisLature. after the contributions have been paid.The keepingof






Here.conditions (a) and (b) express the Nash equilibrium among parties in the second-
stage of the ame. while condition (d) ensures that no lobby can profitability deviate
duringthe initial stage
4Equilibrium with One Lobby
We begin the analysis with the case in which there is only a single, organized lobby.
In this simply setting we are able to expose quite clearly the incentives facing the
lobbyand therebyset the stage for the more complicated situation that arises when
several groupscompetefor favors. The single-lobbycasealso may be of independent
interest.inasmuchasit sheds light on the determination of whatBaron(1992)refers
to as particularist policies. These are policies whose benefits can be denied to those
who do not contribute to the lobbying effort and whose costs are spread so thinly in
the population that they do not inspire groups to organize in opposition. Baron cites
as examples the special provisions in bills that favor particular firms or industries and
the interventions that legislators sometimes make with the bureaucracy on behalf of
their supporters-
To facilitate the exposition, we now adopt particular functional forms for the
distribution function, F(.), and for the effectiveness-of-campaign-spending function,
H(-). We assume that informed voters' preferences for the ideological platform of
party B are distributed uniformly in the range — — ). ThenF[u1(p%)
—
uI(pB)J= + 6 + f[u(p')— ut(pB)] foru'(y/) —u1(pB)
— — })- Wealso
take H(-) to be linear and of the form H(CA— C8)=+6 + h(C- —C8).With this
specification, if the two parties happen to choose the same non-ideological policies
and if they spend the same amounts on their campaigns, then party A will capture a
fraction + 6 of the votes. The parameter 6 can be interpretS as the cx ante voter
bias in favor of party A. We might expect 6 > 0 if party A is the incumbent party
12and b c 0 ii pafty B is the incumbent party. Such an incumbency advantage could
reflect namerecognitionandperhapsthe feelingthat the devil you know is better
thanthe devilyoudon't." Aslo, &mightdiffer from 0becauseone party'sideological
agenda has greaterpublic appeal than the other's. When & =0,wewillsaythat the
parties are equallypopular.
Whenonly a single interest group curries the politicians' favors, its problem can
be treated as one of direct control. That is, we can view the lobby as if it could
implement any pair of policy platforms it desires, provided that its contributAon offers
are sufficiently large as to be acceptable to the parties. Each party always has the
option of declining the lobby's offer, in which case it would choose the platform that
attracted the greatest number of informed voters. To prevent this from happening,
the lobby's contribution must be among those that satisfy a participation constraint.
How large must the contribution to party A be in order to induce it to choose
some policy pA? Recall the relationship between the parties' platforms and campaign
budgets and the election outcome, in the light of our linearity assumptions for F()
and H(). We haves =&1+(1_c)f[W(pA)_W(p8)]+Qh(C'fCf), where W(p) a
;i;hE!u'(p)diistheaverage welfare of informed voters when the non-ideological policy
is p. If the party were to refuse to be influenced by the lobby's offer, it would choose
the policy that best served the average informed voter. This policy, which we denote
by p, satisfies VW(y) =0.10 Sothe lobby must guarantee the party at least as
many seats as it would apture by endorsing y.Evidently,it must offer to party A a
contribution of at least '1[W(p) —WQ?)J.Notice that the size ol the minimum
payment does not depend on the policy position anticipatedfrom party B.
Similarly, the lobby must offer party B a contribution of at least "11[W(p) —
W(p8)]in order to induce it to adopt the platform p8. The lobby's problem, then,
is to choose p-4 and pB to maximize (2), subject to the constraints that
Cf￿(')f[wp_wpx)1forKA,B. (3)
L011theinformed voters are a representative sample of the total populationofvoters, in the sense
thatthe distribution of utility functions among informed and uninformed voters is the same then
the policy p is the one that maximizes a Benthamite social welfare function.
1:3The constraints stipulate the minimum sizes of the campaign contributions as Func-
tions of the platforms the group chooses.
Let us suppose, for the moment, that the lobby decides to give the two parties
exactly what is needed to induce them to support the platforms p'4 and p8,but
nothing more. \Vith these contributions, party .4 captures a fraction + b of the
seats, while party B captures the remaining fraction —b,no matter what the policies
p'4 and p8 happen to be. Then the (constrained) optimal platforms from the Lobby's
vantage point satisfy
=argmax[kw(p)
+(1 for K =A,8, (4)
where= (b+) and= 1—y(b+ ). Evidently, the lobby induces the parties
to behave as if they were maximizing weighted sums of the welfare of the interest
group and the average informed voter.
It may help to think about some specific examples to understand exactly what this
means. Consider, for instance, the classical problem of an industry that generates a
negative externality. If the externality is linked to the scale of production, then a per-
unit output tax equal to the marginal damage best serves the interests of the average
voter. But suppose that the industry's lobby links its campaign contributions to the
size of the industry tax or subsidy. Then the equilibrium platforms will be ones that
maximize weighted sums of average welfare (i.e., consumer surplus plus profits plus
tax revenue) and industry profits. These platforms may involve a tax or a subsidy,
and will certainly be more generous to the industry than the "optimal" Pigouvian
tax.tt Or consider an economy that produces a single output from fixed supplies
of capital and labor and where utility is linear in consumption. The welfare of the
average voter is maximized by a flexible wage policy that ensures full employment of
the L workers. But if a union representing the workers offers donations to the parties
that are contingent on their endorsing a minimum wage policy, then the equilibrium
Let d bethe marginal damage caused by a unit of the industry's output and let t' bethe
per-unit tax advocated by party K. Then in political equilibrium, t" = d — [(i—oU1 (z/r'), where
ILS industryoutput and z' is the slope of the industry supply curve.
14platforms will contain such proposals as long as the elasticity of labor demandisnot
too high.'2
Several features of the platforms prescribed by (4) are worthy of comment. First.
since ,(b + ) > ,itis the more popular party that applies greater weight to
the welfare ofthespecial interest group. That is, the lobby induces the party whose
ideological agenda has greater public appeal to choose a non-ideological platform that
is closer to the lobby's ideal position. But then this party's platform is further from
the ideal of the average (informed) voter. The latter fact, together with (a), implies
that the lobby contributesmoreto the party with the better election prospects. The
last observation is in keeping with Snyder's (1990) view of political contributions as
investments in contingent claims (the claims pay off only if the recipients end up in
a position to influence policy), a view which he supports with evidence on campaign
gifts to candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives.
Both parties cater more to the special interest group the greater is the susceptibil-
ity of uninformçd voters to campaign spending and the larger is the fraction of these
individuals in the total voter population (i.e., the larger are h and a, respectively). On
the other hand, the platforms more fully reflect the interests of the average informed
voter the smaller is the diversity of preferences over the ideological issue. When the
range of the 's is small (i.e., f is large), there are more voters at the marginof
indifference between the two parties, and so an endorsement of a platform that ne-
glects the public interest is more costly to the parties.'3 As a final point, we note
the similarity between the form of the equilibrium platforms here and the equilibrium
'2Let F(K, 14 be the aggregate production function. The minimum wage t1Isupported by patty
Kmaximizes ç"thL +Ukf F(K,L)subject to the constraints that L, <Iand FL(K,L) =tb
Thesolutionhasaminimum wageabovethe market-clearingwage providedthat
ah#
wherec—FL/LFLL.is the elasticity of labor demand.
'3Dixit and Londregan (1994) find similarly that transfer policies tend to favor groups of voters
that have scentrain views on the non-ideological issues, and thus many individualson the margin of
indifferencebetween the two candidates.
15policies that emerged from the model in Grossman and Helpman(1994). There (in
thecontext of tariff formation) we assumed that a single incumbent policy maker has
as her objective the maximization of a weighted sum of campaign contributions and
average voter welfare. We showed that the equilibrium policies satisfy an equation
with the same form as (4). We now find that—at least in the single-lobby case—the
government-as-agent framework represents a proper reduced form of a model with
electoral competition.
We have so far assumed that the interest group would wish to make the partici-
pation constraints bind for both political parties. In other words, the group will offer
each party exactly what it takes to win its support for the desired platform - Let us
examine now when this will be the case. We know that the first-order conditions for
the maximization ofwith respect to Ct and C'fimply
— W(p2)] = — ,\4; (5)
— W(p')]=1. — )u, (6)
where A' is the Lagrange multiplier on the participation constraint applicable to
party K. It is clear that \K must be positive for at least one K (i.e.. the pat-ticipatiuLl
constraint must bind for at least one party), because the left-hand sides of (5) and
(6) have opposite signs. In other words, it never pays for the lobby to give more
than is necessary to both of the parties, because if it did it could cut back on the
two contributions while leaving the platforms and the distribution of seats in the
parliament unchanged. Moreover, if the lobby does give more than is required to
one of the parties, it must be the one that endorses its more-preferred platform; for
example, (5) can be satisfied with A'4 = 0 only if W(jø) > 14'3(p8).
Indeed, only the party that is exantemore popular is a candidate to receive
extra campaign support. To see this, suppose that the other was receiving the Larger
contribution. Then the lobby could switch the labels on its offers (i.e., offering to
party A what it had intended to offer to B, and viceversa) andat the same time
reduce its (new) offer to the more popular party, in such a way as to preserve the
16original probability distribution over policy outcomes. This would reduce its total
contribution bill, which clearly would be profitable for the Lobby.
lithe lobby does give to the more-popular party in excess of what is needed to gain
its acquiescence. the motivation would be to help that party capture more seats. By
doing so, the lobby could increase the probability that its preferred platform would be
implemented by the parliament. Suppose that party Aisthe more popular party! and
suppose that the lobby contemplates giving this party a bit more than is needed to
induce the party to choose the policy p'. The expected marginal benefit from the first
dollar of "extra" contribution would be p'(s)ah( Wj(p'4) —W1(pB)],which reflects the
group's preference for A'splatformand its marginal effect on the probability that this
platform wilt be implemented. The marginal cost of the extra contribution is of course
1. Evidently, the lobby finds an electoral motive to contribute to party .4 (beyond the
influence motive that always exists) only ii the lobby would fare very differently under
the alternative platforms, if campaign spending is relatively productive in buying
undecided votes (a and harelarge), and if increased representation in the parliament
greatly enhances a party's prospects for implementing its program ('(s)is large).
The size of the difference W(p4)—W(p8)reflectstwo considerations. First, it reflects
the extent of the voters' predisposition to party A.Thesmaller the bias 6, the closer
together will be the two party's platforms, and the less likely it is that the lobby will
perceive a benefit from helping party Atowin more seats. Second, it reflects the
absolute size of the lobby's stake in the policy choice, in comparison to the aggregate
stake borne by the informed electorate. in other words, "a dollar" will loom large in
comparison to the potential gain W,Qø)—Wj(p8)when (1 —a)W()islarge compared
to W3(-). This is because contributions are measured in units of account that reflect
the size of gift needed to compensate for a given unpopular position.
5 Equilibrium with Several Lobbies
4ow we seek a Nash equilibrium when multiple interest groups vie for influence over
the parties' platforms. Again we are free to treat the lobbies as if they were facing
17problems of direct control, but this time we must incorporate into their constraints
theanticipatedactions of the rival organizations. Consider for example the problem
confronting the interest group 1.Thisgroup behaves as if it were designing the plat-
formspj and p, but it takes as given the contribution schedules offered by the other
lobbies. It makes the choice to maximize its own welfare, subject to the constraint
that its offers must be large enough to induce the parties to comply. Of course, in
equilibrium. all of the lobbies' choices" must be mutually consistent; i.e., they all
must designate the same platforms, which are the ones that the two parties announce.
More formally, let CL(p") C'f(pJ')be the aggregate contribution schedule
offered to party Kbyall lobbies other than 1.Thenlobby I chooses pj',p. (74. and




[1_afW(pfl+ ('L(pP)] forK =:1./3.
Theconstraints ensure that each party prefers to endorse its prescrilntd pla 1[ortii than
to choose an alternative and decline the offer from lobby 1.Forfuture reference, we
denote by p5 the policy vector that maximizes (1 —a)JW(p) +ahC'±,(p).rthisis
the best that party K could do if it were to ignore the offer from lobby 1.
Again, let us provisionally assume that lobby I opts to make the participation
constraints bind with respect to each party. When lobby 1 pays these minimally
acceptable contributions, it anticipates that party A will capture a fraction + b+
(1 —a)f[W(p1)
—W(p1)J+ ah[C1(p,) —C,(p3]of the seats. Notice that this
fraction is a constant (say .,)fromthe lobby's point of view. It follows that the
platforms that maximize expected group 'welfare must satisfy the first-order conditions
y(flVWi(p) + hfVW(P + VC,(p)= U
and
[1 -(]VWg(p) + QhfVt)+ VC(p) =U. (8)
Now look at the problem from the parties' perspective. When confronted with the
full set of contribution schedules, they set their platforms to maximize their shares of
18the vote.Thefirst-order conditions for these maximizations imply
(1— a)JVW(p" ) + ahVC"(p') = 0 for K = A, 8, (9)
whereC"(p")L1 isthe aggregate contribution schedule conironting party
K.Inwords, the party balances on the margin the loss of informed votes caused by
its deviating from p against the additional uninformed votes it captures by spending
the extra proceeds from the special interest groups.
In the equilibrium, the platforms anticipated by each lobby must be the same as
those actually announced by the parties; i.e., pf' =p1'for all I and for It' =A,B.
Therefore, we can combine (7), (8), and (9) to derive
=VCj't(p'4); (10)
[1 —p(J)]VWs(p8)=VC(p8)- (11)
These equations reveal an important property of the equilibrium contribution sched-
ules. Each of these schedules must be "locally truthful" in the neighborhood of the
equilibrium platforms. In other words, when a lobby treats the make-up of the parlia-
meat as a given, it designs its bids so that the shape of a schedule accurately reflects
the expected benefit it would derive from a. small change in the party's jlatform
around the equilibrium.'4
In a sub-game perfect equilibrium, all lobbies must anticipate the same election
outcome. So Je =0 forall 1. Using this fact, (10) and (11) can be combined with
(9), to yield conditions that the equilibrium platforms must satisfy when all lobbies
opt to have both participation constraints bind. These are
pV)LVW3(PM)+(11Vp) = (12)
(1
—(s°)]SVWQA)+ ;:)fvwpai =0. (13)
t4seeGrossmanandHctpman (1994) for further discussion of local truthfulness and its relation
to "global truthfulness", as defined by Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
19These conditions have the followinginterpretation. Inequilibrium, each party acts
as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfare of alt interest group
members and the aggregate welfare of informed voters, In this 'as if' calculation,
the weights depend on the expected composition of the legislature, which the parties
treat as fixed.
Conditions (12) and (13) provide a partial answer to the question, Which interest
groups are most successful in influencing government policy? The answer, we hnd,
is that all organized interest groups are equally successful, in the sense that their
members receive equal weight in the parties' political calculus. The net effect of the
private campaign financing is to push policy in a direction that is favorable to the
average member of an interest group and away from the policy that would best serve
the interests of the average (informed) voter. Of course, the 6nal platform choices
will not be equalt close to the bliss points of all the lobbies; this depends on how
similar a lobby's policy preferences are to those of the average voter and how the
other interest groups line up on the issues of concern to it.
The conditions that characterize the equilibrium platforms have another inter-
esting implication. The political system works best, of course, when all voters are
informed about the issues (o = 0). Then the interest groups are ineffectual and both
parties choose the platform that maximizes aggregate welfare. But the same out-
come is achieved in a very different set of circumstances. Suppose that every voter
is a member of exactly one interest group and that the informed voters constitute
a representative sample of the electorate. Then, no matter how large the fraction
of uninformed voters nor how susceptible these voters may be to campaign rhetoric,
the equilibrium policies again will be the ones that best serve the voters' (collective)
interests.
Notice that (12) and (13) do not uniquely determine the equilibrium platforms.
Besides p't° and p, the (expected) composition of the legislature (c) appears in
these expressions. The equilibrium seat count depends, in turn, on the total amounts
of contributions collected by the parties. It is true, as in the case of a single lobby,
that an individual interest group prefers to concentrate its giving on the party that it
20expects will be in a better position to implement its platform. And it is also true that
the party expected to capture a parliamentary majority caters more to the speciat
interests. But there is a potential here for self-fulfilling prophesies that does not exist
when a singlelobbyplays the contribution game. The setf-fulfllling prophesies reflect
a type of coordination failure among the lobbies.
Suppose. for example, that party A happens to be the more popular party (Li >0).
hutthateach lobby expects that party B wilt capture the majority of the seats.
These expectations are based on thebelief thatthe otherlobbies will give more
generouslytoparty B than to party A. Then each lobby will be well justified in
concentrating its efforts on influencing B's platform and, in the end, their expectations
maybe validated. Whereas an only lobby can always gain by ensuring that the more
popular party wins the majority of the seats, a lobby that is one among many cannot
necessarily do so. To reverse the fortunes of the two parties in a way that conserves
resources it may need the tacit cooperation of other lobbies.
The potential for multiplicity of equilibria can also be understood in another way.
Recall that s = Li+ (1 —a)f[W(p±4)
—W(p)]+ch[Cf(p) — C7(p,) wheit
lobby1 makes the minimal contributions needed to induce the platforms p0 and
pSO.Ofcourse, if all lobbies give minimally, then this condition must hold for each
one. The policies P4i and p are the ones that the parties would choose if they
ignored the offer from lobby 1. Notice that these policies depend on the shapes of the
lobbies' contribution schedules away from the equilibrium. And while the equilibrium
requirements place some restrictions on the global shapes of these schedules (for
example, (1 —a)f[W(p)
—W(p)]+ah[C,°(p,)— Cf,°(p1)]must be the same for
all I) the requirements are not enough to pin down the equilibrium uniquely.
Still, some of the Nash equilibria may be more compelling than others. For ex-
ample, if 6 = 0, the symmetric equilibrium—in which the lobbies treat the parties
similarly and the election yields an evenly split parliament—may be focal- If Li >0,
the lobbies would have no particular reason to expect a preponderance of the contri-
butions to go to party B, and in some cases they will have good reasons to expect
the opposite. One such case arises when all lobbies are offering positive contributions
21to both parties,not only in the neighborhood of the equilibrium, butalsoaround
the various points that the parties would chose if one of the lobby groups were to be
ignored. In this situation, the equilibrium with .s cis Pareto dominated for the
entire set of interest groups by another with $ > . The alternative equilibrium can
be constructed as follows. Let each lobby offer to party Binthe new equilibrium
exactly what it offered to party .4 in the old. Let each construct its new offer to party
.4 by subtracting a fixed amount from the (positive) offers to party Binthe old, plus
an additional amount that increases with the distance from the initial pTh: Finally.
Let the fixed reductions be chosen so that party Acapturesas many seats in the new
equilibrium as party B did in the old, and let the additional reductions be chosen so
that no party will decline the offer from some lobby in setting its platform)5 The
newly constructed contribution schedules are best responses to one another, and they
induce each party to chose the platform in the new equilibrium that the other chose
in the old. Finally, since each party wins as many seats in the new as the other did
in the old, the new equilibrium has exactly the same distribution of policy outcomes
as the old. It follows that all interest groups gain.
More generally, anytime b > 0 and s c , the lobbies are paying excessively to
enable the less popular party to capture a majority of the seats. It is never in their
collective interest to do so. But it may not always be possible to devise alternative
contribution schedules that allow each to pay a smaller contribution while preserving
the probability distribution over policy outcomes. If it is not possible to do so, then
a Pareto improvement may not be available within the set of Nash equilibria. In
such cases the realization of joint gains may require the enforcement of an explicitly
'5That is,letCf(p)bethe initial schedule offered by lobby j to party K and let Cf(p) be the
alternative. We propose Cf(p) = C(p)iorall j andCf(p)= Cf(p)—— 2'2 (p — p8) where each
Z,()is a function that is everywhere non-negative and that reaches a unique maxtrnum at 0. Let
the constants xj be chosen so that z 0 and E,gj= andthe functions Z(-) so that
(1— cz)fW(p8) + E,Cf(p8)> max, {(1 —a)fW(p)+ oh [Cf(p)
—Z(p
—p8)J — chzi}
for all!. This will be possible, provided that the Cf (pf1) in the initial equilibrium arelargeenough.
In theevent, party .4chooses theplatform fr'= p8, partyBchooses 0 = pA, andLobbyI gains
relativeto the initial equilibrium.
99cooperative arrngernent. where some lobbies agree to some political actions that
are not best responsestothe others and where certain of the interest groups receive
transfers as side payments under the agreement.'6
Let us return to the question of whether the interest groups would give to their
favorite parties beyond what is needed to effect their influence over the platforms.
We note first that (generically) at most one Lobby group can perceive an electoral
motive for contributing to a given party. For, suppose that lobbies I and 2 each gave
extra contributions to party A in order to bolster the party's election returrs. Then.
in equilibrium, the marginal benefit perceived by lobby jforcontributing to this
party would be ;'(s)oh[W1(p'4)— W,(p8)),for j= 1,2.while of course the marginal
cost for each would be 1. Both lobbies could satisfy their first-order conditions for
optimal giving only if W1(p'4) —W1(p8)happened to equal W2(p') —%1/2(p2);that
is, if the two lobbies held exactly the same absolute preference for party A's platform
relative to that of party B. Electoral support beyond what is justified by the influence
motive constitutes a public good for all groups that prefer the recipients policy. As
in many other contexts, it is only the player that has the most to gain that might
voluntarily contribute toward the public good. Moreover, the likelihood that any
lobby will be willing to make such "excess" contributions declines as the number of
lobbies increases. As with the case of a single interest group, each lobby perceives
an electoral motive for giving only if ,'(s)ah(W1Qø) — > 1at the candidate
equilibrium where all participation constraints bind. But the greater is the number of
lobbies, the smaller will be the stake of any one of them in the set of non-ideological
policies. In the limit, when all interest groups are "small", the electoral motive for
giving vanishes for every group. The influence motive remains, however, and so (12)
and (13) characterize the equilibrium platforms.
L6SVesuspect that any equilibrium that has the Less popular candidate winning a majority of the
seats will not be a coalition-proof equilibrium (see Bernheim et al., 1987). Our, we have not been
able to prove this for all types of equilibria.
236 Summary
Interest groups make campaign contributions either to influence election outcomes
or to influence policies. We have developed a model of campaign finance in which
special interests may have either or both of these motives for giving. In the model,
the special interests tailor schedules that link campaign gifts to policy endorsements.
The schedules are proposed to two political parties, who are vying for seats in a
parliamentary election. The parties have fixed stances on a set of ideological issues
but have yet to announce their positions on some non-ideological policies, about which
they have no inherent preferences. Confronted with offers from the various interests,
the parties announce their campaign platforms. They trade off the extra campaign
contributions that may be forthcoming if they cater to the groups1 demands against
the votes that this may cost them among the well-informed segment of the electorate.
The paper analyzes the equilibrium of a two-stage game. In the first stage, the
interest groups strategically design their contribution schedules to maximize their
expected welfare net of political pay-outs. In the second stage, the two parties choose
platforms to maximize their representation in the parliament. In the voting booth, an
informed voter casts her ballot for the party whose platform she prefers. In contrast,
an uninformed (or, perhaps, impressionable) voter may respond to campaign rhetoric.
The difference in platforms and spending levels determines the election outcome,
which in turn decides the probability that each party's platform will be implemented.
Our model predicts divergence in policy platforms. The party that is expected to
win the majority of the seats garners greater attention from the special interests. As
a result, it is induced to adopt a platform that gives more weight to their concerns.
The underdog party also caters somewhat to the special interests, but its equilibrium
platform is closer to the bliss point of the average informed voter. This finding may
have relevance for the debate over term limits. With the advantage that incumbency
brings in ternis of name recognition and reputation, incumbents are overwhelming
favorites in many elections. Our analysis suggests that these candidates may convert
their popularity into campaign war chests, with detrimental effects on the welfare of
the average voter. Term limits would periodically restore a more even election. and
24thus might diminish the influence of the special interests.
When interest groups offer the parties contributions that are platform contingent.
they inducein them a preference ordering over the non-ideologicalpolicies. Inour
model,these preferences take a particularly simple form- Each party is induced to
behave as if itweremaximizing a weighted sum of the welfare levels of two groups in
the polity. The aggregate interest of infonned voters receives a weight that increases
with the share of such voters in the voting population and decreases with the diversity
of their opinions about the relative desirability of the parties' ideologicaVpositions.
The aggregate interest of members of organized interest groups receives a weight that
increases with the susceptibility of uninformed voters to campaign spending. The
weight implicitly given to the interest group members also varies with the number of
seats a party is expected to win, which accounts for the above-mentioned difference in
the parties' platforms. It is interesting to note that many political-economy models
ascribe weighted social welfare functions to politicians making policy choices. Our
mode! provides some underpinnings for this common specification.
If interest groups can communicate platform-contingent contribution often, they
will always perceive an influence motive for giving to each party whose platform might
eventually become policy. But the groups may or may not perceive an incentive
to give to their favorite party beyond what is needed to exert the desired degree
of influence. We have shown that the electoral motive for giving—which features
prominently in many previous models of campaign contributions—can operate for at
most one interest group favoring each political party. This is because gifts that bolster
a party's election prospects benefit all interest groups that prefer the party's platform.
Only the interest group with the greatest relative preference for the party is candidate
to contribute toward this public good. We find, moreover, that campaign giftswith
an electoral motive may be the exception, rather than the rule. No groupwill give
beyond what is needed to compensate the party for a!tering its policy positionunless
the group has an aggregate stake in policy that is relatively large compared to the
stake of the electorate as a whole.
Finally, what of the election outcome? Our model predict5 a unique equilibrium
25when only a single interest group is organized to offer contributions to the parties. In
this equilibrium,the party that is more popular with votersbasedon its ideological
positions alone captures a majority of the seats in the elected parliament. The interest
group contributes more to the more popular party, and at least compensates it for
choosing the less popular policies. Thus, the contributions ensure that the more
popular party captures at least as many seats as it would in the absence of the
influence- seeking.
However, once there are several interest groups that actively compete for ihfluence,
our model allows scope for self-fulfilling prophesies. Each group's giving depends upon
its expectations about the others. If a lobby expects the others to compete vigorously
for a certain party's favor, then it too will have an incentive to focus its eftorts on that
party. Then, if all happen to concentrate on the party whose ideological platform has
Less appeal, the result may be a parliament in which this party captures a majority.
In the aggregate, the lobbies may pay handsomely to overcome voters' resistance.
Still, each may be stuck with this outcome unless all can cooperate and make side
payments.
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297 Appendix: Strict Majority Rule
Weassumed in the main text that political parties seek to maximize theirrepre-
sentation in the legislature and that a party holding a majority of seatsmay fail to
implement its policy program. While quite reasonable as descriptions of the politi-
cal process, these assumptions are admittedly somewhat ad hoc. In this appendix,
we take a more "purist" approach, by assuming that parties maximize their chances
of winning a majority and that the legislature operates by strict majority çule. We
concentrate on the symmetric equilibrium that may emerge when the two parties are
equally popular. Equalpopularityimplies F(O)= andH(O)=, and, with the
previously-encountered linearity assumptions on F(•)andH(-).b= 0.
We now suppose that interest group members comprise a negligible fraction of
the voting population and that voters' preferences for the ideological agenda of party
Barestatistically independent. Also, the total number of voters, n, is large but
finite. Then, the number of votes for party Acanbe approximated by a normal
distribution, with mean EEI F(A1)+anH(AC) and variance L€i F(A')fl —
anH(A')[i
—H(Ac)],where & u(pA) —te(9).and Ac =C'4—C7Party A
wins theelection with (approximate) probability




where N(.)representsthe standardized normal distribution function.
Each interest group designs its contribution schedule to maximize the aggregate
expected utility of its members. Recognizing that with probability w(-) the non-
ideological policy vector will be p' and with probability 1 — ir(.) it will be p2. lobby
I chooses C/4(p'4) and C,9p8) to maximize ir(-)W(p')+(1 — ir(.)J W(p8) — Cj4(p') —
Cfl(p2), taking as given the contribution schedules proffered by the other lobbies.
The parties subsequently set p-4 and p2 to maximize r and I — r. respectively.
'TThe approximation follows from the Liapunov central limit theorem, which requires also that
the variance term becomes unbounded as n grows large. For a discussion of the applicability of this
theorem in the context of a probabilistic voting model, see Lindbeck and Weibull ([981).
30As before, we can treateach lobbies'problem as one of direct control. Lobby
1 chooses pj1. p, C14,andC,tomaximize its expected utility, taking C±jptk) and
C'Jp8)asgiven. It also recognizes the participation constraints,which require that
each party achieve at least as great a probability of winning when setting the policy
designated by lobby / as it could be choosing an alternative policyand receiving




anda similar condition for party B. We focus on symmetric equilibria,wherein
= CL), lobby / chooses the same platform and contributionfor each party1
and the participation constraints bind.
Let p' be the platform designated by lobby I. The first-order condition for maxi-
mizing the lobbies' expected utility with respect to thechoice of p implies
VWc(p)+ VW(p) + VC1(pfl =0. (1-5)
where we have made use of the fact that ir(p,p,0) = at the symmetric equilibrium.t8
Party A chooses its equilibrium platform, p0, to maximize ,r[ppRO C0(pl) —
c80(pBo)]. Again making use of the symmetry conditions, pdAO = = pV and
= C80() = C°(), this implies
(1
—a)fVW(p°)+crhVC°(p°)=0. (16)
Consistencyrequires p? = p° for all1.Thus1(15) and(16)imply
VWi(p°)
=VC,°(p°) (17)
which isanother "local truthfulness"result.Finally,combining (16) and(17)we find
.VW,(p°) +(1 0VW(p0)= 0. (18)
'81nderiving (15) we have used the Brst-order condition with respect to C( to substitute out
the Lagrange multiplier on the participation constraint. We have alsomade extensive use of the
symmetry condttons, p(° = p0 = pT and C( = C? = Cr.
31The platform p that satisfies (18) is the same as the platform p.40thatsatisfies
(12) and the platform p that satisfies (13), when s° =. Wesee that, with equal
popularity, the platform that emerges in a symmetric equilibrium when the legislature
operates by strict majority rule and parties maximize their chances of winning a
majority is the same as the platform that emerges in symmetric equilibrium when
parties maximize their representation in the parliament and a minority platform has
some chance of being implemented.'9
'9Tbis result mimics a similaz tindingby Lindbeck andWeibull (1987), who assumed that all
votersareinformed voters and that campaign contributions play no role in the election.
32